# Neg- PCDS Militarism Aff- TOC – Nirmal

## Strat

Heg Good

T Any

Util Framing

A lot of the frontlining will be 2NC work vs the 1AR you heard him give against Jason.

Also he was planning on breaking new against you in Harvard elims, he might do that again so not sure about how effective this neg will end up being.

## T-Any

#### Interpretation- On the Jan/Feb 2017 topic, the aff cannot specify a single type of constitutionally protected speech that their advocacy does remove a restriction for. To clarify, plan inclusive counterplans that remove restrictions in single type of speech are illegitimate.

#### “Any” is a negative polarity term which means that it is indefinite- especially considering that the res\* is a downward entailing operator

**Kadmon and Landman 93** [Nirit Kadmon and Fred Landman. “Any” Linguistics and Philosophy Vol 16, No. 4 Aug 1993. Springer. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25001516. ] NB

As is well known, any can function in two different ways hand, it can be a negative polarity item - POLARITY SENSITIV on the other hand, it has what is called a 'free choice' inte FREE CHOICE (FC) any. In this paper, we will propose a unifie of the semantic and pragmatic effects of any, which applies to its uses. The use of any as a negative polarity it is illustrated in (1) and (2). (1) I don't have any potatoes. (2) \*I have any potatoes. According to Ladusaw 1979's well known analysis, negative polarity items (NPIs) are only licensed if they are in the scope of a downward entailing operator. A downward entailing (DE) operator is an operator that reverses the direction of entailment, roughly as specified in (3) (using > for entailment). (3) O is a DE operator iff if A => B then O(B) = O(A). On Ladusaw's account, example (1) is OK because any is in the scope of negation, which, as illustrated in (4), is a DE operator. (4) swim = move I don't move => I don't swim In example (2), any is not licensed, because there is no DE operator that any is in the scope of. Ladusaw's analysis elegantly accounts for a wide range of examples. Besides negative vs. affirmative pairs like (1) and (2), it deals, for example, with examples (5)-(8). (5) At most three girls saw anything. (6) \*At least three girls saw anything. (7) Every girl who saw anything was happy. (8) \*Some girl who saw anything was happy. Assuming, with Generalized Quantifier Theory, that determiners are two place relations between a nominal property and a verbal property, Ladu saw predicts that (5) and (7) are OK because the determiner at most three is DE on its second argument (as well as the first) and the determiner every is DE on its first argument. (6) and (8) are out because at least three and some are not DE on either argument. Ladusaw's analysis of polarity sensitivity is quite successful. It gives semantic content to Klima 1964's suggestion that NPIs are licensed by 'affective' expressions, and it improves upon the analysis of Baker (1970), which is based on licensing by overt negation, in that the notion of DE provides a uniform account of the licensing of NPIs in examples with and without negation. However, there remain some empirical and theoretical issues that Ladusaw's analysis leaves unresolved. We now turn to such issues. We note the four issues summarized in (9), on which we will comment in turn immediately below. (9) constitutes, in fact, a summary of our goals: what we set out to do in this paper is provide an analysis of any that can successfully deal with these four issues. (9)i. the connection between PS any and FC any (goal: a unified analysis); ii. any as an expression which indicates reduced tolerance of ex ceptions; iii. the distribution of the NPI as determined by its meaning and function; iv. empirical problems with the licensing of NPIs I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PS ANY AND FC ANY. (10)-(12) are ex amples of free choice any. (10) Any owl hunts mice. (11) Any lawyer could tell you that. (12) I would dance with anybody. Ladusaw (1979) offers a whole battery of arguments that show beyond doubt that PS any is an indefinite with an existential meaning. (Arguments for this are also given by Horn (1972) and others.) FC any, on the other hand, seems to have universal quantificational force. And this goes beyond mere appearance. Carlson (1981) gives several arguments that FC any is in fact a universal quantifier. A strong argument is the behavior of almost. Almost is an operator that can modify only universal determiners, as illustrated in (13)-(15). (13) Almost every lawyer could answer that question (14)Almostnolawyer (15)\*Almostsomelaw As (16) and (17) show, alm strongly suggests that FC (16)Almostanylawye (17)\*Idon'thavealmo (This goes back to Horn absolutely. Note that we alm ost is a sentential ad conclusion - towards w ambiguous:PSanyisan quantifier.

#### “Any” does not tolerate exceptions, because it’s either an existential quantifier or a universal quantifier

**Kadmon and Landman 93** [Nirit Kadmon and Fred Landman. “Any” Linguistics and Philosophy Vol 16, No. 4 Aug 1993. Springer. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25001516. ] NB

What is it that any adds to the meaning of the indefinite NP? We think it contributes what we have described above as reduced tolerance of exceptions. Compare the (a) and (b) sentences in the following examples. (26)a. I don’t have potatoes. b. I don’t have any potatoes. (=(l) above) (27)a. Every man who has matches is happy. b. Every man who has any matches is happy. (28)a. An owl hunts mice. (=(22) above) b. Any owl hunts mice. (=(10) above) In some sense, the (b) sentences rule out exceptions more strongly than the (a) sentences do. Let us clarify and illustrate this point. A context of utterance sets up a domain of quantification, from which all sorts of things are excluded. For example, in a given context, rotten potatoes or sick owls may be excluded as irrelevant. For that reason, you can accept (26a) as true even if you know that I do in fact have a few rotten potatoes in the back yard, and you can accept (283) as true even if you don’t think that sick owls hunt mice. The effect of any in the (b) sentences, especially when it carries main or emphatic stress, is to indicate that even things that could previously be disregarded as irrelevant (in a given context) are no exception to the claim being made. Thus, I don’t have ANY potatoes may imply: not even rotten ones; ANY owl hunts mice may imply: even a sick one - the use of any indicates that even rotten potatoes or sick owls (which might have otherwise been disregarded) are no exception. In what follows, we will discuss several concrete cases, where we supply contexts for our example sentences. The content of utterance may implicitly or explicitly suggest that only cooking potatoes (the regular potatoes you might find in the pantry) are relevant. For example, suppose you say (29) or (30). (29) Could we make some French fries? (30) I feel like French fries. Do you have cooking potatoes today? If I utter (26a) (1 don’t have potatoes) in the context of what you have just said, I mean that I don’t have cooking potatoes. In this context, it is irrelevant that I do have, say, some potted potatoes decorating my room (on the assumption that my potted potatoes are not cooking potatoes), since non-cooking potatoes are not taken into account. Because my potted potatoes are disregarded in the context, they constitute legitimate excep- tions to the claim I made by uttering (26a). Now, suppose you say (30) and I reply by saying (26b): 1 don’t have ANY potatoes! This time, I am not just talking about the potatoes that would normally be considered relevant in the context of (30) (i.e. regular cooking potatoes); this time I am saying that I don’t have other potatoes, either. My utterance may very well imply that I am no longer in possession of the potted potatoes that you eyed hungrily on previous occasions. Even though decorative potatoes would not normally be relevant in the context of (30), the use of any may indicate that they too are no exception to the claim that I don’t have potatoes.

#### Violation-

#### 1. Specification is incompatible with “any” as an indefinite. Indefinites do not refer to particular instantiations of the resolution.

**NOD** [New Oxford Dictionary “Indefinite” adjective.] NB

lasting for an unknown or unstated length of time: they may face indefinite detention. • not clearly expressed or defined; vague: their status remains indefinite. • Grammar (of a word, inflection, or phrase) not determining the person, thing, time, etc., referred to.

#### 2. Even if “any” permits few exceptions, the aff is only a single example of the resolution, so it can’t affirm the general rule of the resolution, let alone exclude any exception

#### Standards

#### 1. Semantics- our interpretation is best aligned with the definitions of individual words and the usage of “any” in different instances. Our interp is the most grammatical and is the most objective since it doesn’t rely on arbitrary determinants of what constitutes the best type of debate- and it determines the stasis point for what we know before the round.

#### 2. Limits- They allow way too many affs if they can allow infinite specifications of types of speech in certain scenarios. Even if there are some turns, the aff is massively overprepped for them since it limits their prep burden whereas im expected to prep against each of these affs. Generics don’t solve- agent CPs or state bad Ks aren’t persuasive vs a nuanced Aff that is also heavily prepped against these. Their counterinterp proves that there’s a t version of the aff- reading it as an advantage solves their education offense and allows for a broader comparison. They explode neg prep burden and predictability which kills fairness and engagement because there isn’t sufficient literature against their position. Caselist: [zones, journalism, offensive words, political speech, advertisements, war protests, painting, not saluting, burning flag, newspapers, specific campuses, dress codes, pornography, books, religious expression, cyberspeech, organizations inside the campus, specific people, specific times, specific places, specific manners on the campuses, commercial speech, speech against specific activities, rights of individual employees on campuses, etc.]

Voter

#### 1. Fairness, debates a competitive activity, 2. Education, only portable impact. Drop the debater because A. Norms- a loss deters future abuse, B. Timeskew- drop the arg means they can kick their offense for a positive time tradeoff. C. Gateway issue- unfair args skew the rest of the round. Evaluate Competing Interps, A. reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention, B. deterrence- debaters can get away with defense on theory, C. reasonability collapses into competing itnersp because we have offense defense debates about brightlines, D. it’s a binary- either the aff is topical or it’s not 5. No RVI: A. Chills theory- RVIs deter me from reading theory because good theory debaters will bait abuse and go for the RVI which causes infinite abuse. B. Kills substance- they will just collapse to the shell which ruins the possibility of us ever returning to having education. C. Illogical- you shouldn’t win for being fair. Logic is an impact because it’s the basis of argumentation. D. No abuse- you could read your own shell or prove that I violate and you don’t which equals the theory layer

## Heg Good

### UQ + Links

#### Congress defense policy increases army efforts to recruit now

**Kheel 3-20** [Rebecca Kheel, 3-20-2017, "Army tackling task of significantly boosting its ranks," TheHill, <http://thehill.com/policy/defense/324593-army-tackling-task-of-significantly-boosting-its-ranks>] NB

When Congress passed its annual defense policy bill calling for the Army to boost its ranks by 16,000 more soldiers than what was planned, the service was left to work out a way to get there. Now, the Army is in the midst of a three-pronged approach: upping recruitment, retention of soldiers and retention of officers. “Army developed a strategy, and the key message there is that the Army’s hiring,” Maj. Gen. Jason Evans, director of military personnel management, said in an interview with The Hill. “One of the challenges of this is time and really trying to turn an institution like this on a dime in a short period of time.” How the Army is dealing with the increase in its ranks this year could provide a window into how it would handle the 60,000-soldier boost that President Trump has floated. But Evans said the service has not had discussions yet about future increases, remaining focused on achieving its goal for this year that was set by Congress. “We have not gotten to that conversation with senior Army leaders and there has not be any conversation about that,” he said. “Right now we’re really focused on FY17. That’s our immediate challenge right now.” Prior to December, the Army had planned on dropping from 475,000 to 460,000 soldiers. But the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) signed into law that month called for an Army of 476,000, tasking the Army with finding and keeping 16,000 more soldiers than it had intended. “I don’t think it will be an unreachable goal,” Evans said. “It’ll be a challenge, but I have confidence that we have a strategy in place to achieve to this goal.” The first approach is to boost recruitment numbers. The Army increased its recruitment goal by 6,000 soldiers, for a total goal of 68,500 this year.

#### The NDAA increases military efforts to recruit on college campuses now

**Neal 16** [Jeff Neal », 12-14-2016, "7 things every fed should know about 2017 NDAA," FederalNewsRadio, <http://federalnewsradio.com/commentary/2016/12/7-things-every-fed-should-know-about-2017-ndaa/>] NB

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is an annual piece of must-pass legislation. Because of that, it typically includes provisions that apply to the entire federal government that would be hard to pass on their own. The 2017 NDAA (all 3,000 pages of it) is no exception, with seven provisions that directly or indirectly will affect every agency. Here is a summary of those provisions and why you should care about them. Direct-hire authority for the Department of Defense for post-secondary students and recent graduates. DoD, like much of the federal government, [needs to bring more young people into the workforce](https://chiefhro.com/2016/03/02/the-ticking-time-bomb-in-the-federal-workforce/" \t "_blank). This provision allows DoD to hire qualified applicants without competition. The number is limited to 15 percent of the number of competitive hires in the previous fiscal year. If it is successful, this authority may serve as a model for the rest of the government. It has the potential to make college recruiting effective again, so this is an important step in rebuilding the government’s ability to recruit young people

#### Colleges are successfully limiting anti-war speech now – it’s key to boosting recruitment

**SW 5** [(Socialist Workers) Cracking down on student protests, International Socialist Review10-7-2005] AT

CAMPUS ADMINISTRATORS are cracking down on student activists who stand up against the presence of military recruiters at their schools. In late September, peaceful protests by students at three campuses--Holyoke Community College (HCC), George Mason University (GMU) and the University of Wisconsin-Madison--were met with police repression that denied students their right to free speech. -- At Holyoke Community College in western Massachusetts, about 30 students were conducting a peaceful picket of an Army National Guard recruiting table in the school cafeteria. The activists had been assured by campus officials that they could leaflet and chant during their picket of the recruiters. But they were attacked by campus security after a few approached the recruiters' table to inquire if their homosexuality would make them ineligible to enlist. One student, Charles Peterson, was put in a chokehold by campus officer Scott Landry--and maced. Landry, who assaulted several other students and bystanders, happens to serve as a staff advisor to the HCC College Republicans, who were enthusiastically encouraging the attack from behind the police lines. Landry then saw another activist wearing a gay and lesbian liberation button, and loudly commented to another officer, "He'll have fun in jail." The counter-recruitment demonstration was called by the HCC Anti-War Coalition (AWC), an affiliate of the Campus Antiwar Network (CAN). A diverse group of activists--black, white, Latino, gay and straight--answered the call. "I was there to speak for my brother," said one student, a member of the AWC Steering Committee. "He was wounded in Iraq...He was promised money for college and a chance to see the world. But he went to Iraq, and he wasn't the same when he came back." Rather than take action against the officers who attacked protesters, campus police threatened Peterson with arrest if he came back to campus. Though an administration official later told him that he is welcome on campus, Peterson has yet to receive any such assurance from the campus police. Peterson says he won't back down, though. "The next time the recruiters are there, I'll be on the front ranks," he said. Following a successful October 3 press conference, preparations were underway for an October 6 solidarity action organized by student antiwar activists from University of Massachusetts-Amherst. -- Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away, campus police at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va., used the same sort of violent tactics against student Tariq Khan, a former airman turned counter-recruitment activist. Khan, who has protested recruiters on his campus before, taped a sign to his chest that read "U.S. out of Iraq, U.S. out of Palestine, U.S. out of North America: Resist tyranny" and silently sat down in a chair several feet away from recruiters. For this modest protest, Khan was exposed to abuse and battery from campus police and other students, pushed off a stage, subjected to pain compliance, and charged with disorderly conduct and trespassing--at his own school! As right-wing students shouted epithets in his face, his sign was ripped off his chest. A former Marine who had been to Iraq told Khan to "shut up," and when Khan asked him how many people he'd killed, the Marine responded "not enough." As Khan began to make another sign, an officer told him, "You're not allowed to do that" and ordered him to leave. When Khan refused, the officer tried to arrest him. Some students repeatedly chanted "Let him go!" as Khan squirmed out of various headlocks and grips, and other students began to jump in with the police, according to several witnesses. "I am being nonviolent while they are using violence against me!" shouted Khan. After finally handcuffing Khan, police dragged him to a police car. Khan, who is half Pakistani, said he received the worst racist abuse at the police station. "You people are the most violent people in the world," he recalls one cop telling him. Another told him not to mouth off in jail because they "will hang you from the ceiling by your feet," a veiled allusion to prisoner torture at Guantánamo Bay. -- At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 25 people mobilized to confront military recruiters at a career fair on one day's notice last week. But the police and administration were intent on preventing the protest from taking place. Ten cops were already inside, and building managers distributed a copy of the administrative code for protests in UW buildings to protesters on their arrival. But this code didn't seem to matter much, since the protesters weren't violating any part of it--they weren't preventing the event from taking place, blocking the recruiters' tables, using signs with sticks, or blocking entrances and exits. Police refused to give protesters any justification for their imminent arrest, and after some time, the protesters decided to move outside and began chanting and handing out leaflets for another hour. With enlistment slumping, military officials are increasingly desperate to find potential recruits. As of September 30, the military had fallen some 7,000 recruits short of its goal for fiscal year 2005--and the National Guard and Army Reserve did even worse. Military officials predict that meeting the coming year's goal will be even more difficult. "I think there's been a big shift in U.S. politics over the last few months," said Elizabeth Wrigley-Field, a student at New York University and member of the Campus Antiwar Network. "The resurgence of the antiwar movement--especially among students who are focusing on counter-recruitment--promises to erect even more barriers to filling the ranks of the military. The antiwar movement has gone from feeling like an embattled minority to feeling like the majority we are. "But we're running up against college administrations that don't want to lose control of the campuses. And they may be facing pressure from a government that's seeing the Army in its worst recruiting slump since 1979--and telling administrators that they need to do whatever it takes to guarantee their success on campuses. "Last semester, there were cases of repression against counter-recruiters, and some of them sparked defense campaigns that were successful and showed the administration that they couldn't get away with repressing student protests. This time, what's amazing is how quickly the schools seemed prepared to deal with the protesters and how happy they were to collude with right-wing students who were singling out individual protesters. "But now we have the successes of last spring to draw on, so HCC and GMU students can have a connection to City College of New York and San Francisco State students who won. Most importantly, the whole student antiwar movement is growing and becoming more confident, and that means the HCC and GMU students have a more powerful movement that's got their back."

#### Their discourse not only contributes the injury and death of soldiers overseas, it also emboldens our enemies abroad by weakening American resolve. Their irresponsible criticism of our soldiers means the aff has blood on their hands

Eyago 5

Eyago (commenter on Sound Politics). Comment #88 on “London Terrorist Attack.” Sound Politics, Sound Commentary on Current Events in Seattle, Puget Sound and Washington State. July 8th, 2005. <http://www.soundpolitics.com/archives/004721.html>

I am angry. I am angry at a lot of people, so read on, because this could mean you. First and foremost, I am angry at Islamic fundamentalists and their desire to kill innocent people in the name of their god and their ideology. I am angry at a group that cannot allow others to believe differently then they, who feel the need to demonize their enemies, who marginalize others in their belief that their way is superior and that those who don't follow their way are contemptible. I am angry that they believe children are expendable. I am also angry at those on this board who, in their anger advocate or speak out in favor of inhumane responses to such actions. I am angry that they cannot see that it is critical that we maintain a higher moral standard despite the cost. We ARE better than these "creatures". I am angry that someone would even suggest that they would prefer terrorists to bomb their political opposites as a punishment for political views. I am angry that anyone would suggest mass killings of innocents in efforts to get the perpetrators. We don't defeat this enemy be becoming like them, we defeat them by being intolerant to what they do. However, we respond in a dignified and moral way. Yes, that includes war, attacking another nation if that is what it comes to, and detaining and interrogating the prisoners. It means that we do capture them, not kill them outright. It means that we treat them AS prisoners, but we treat them humanely. It means that we DO use coercive tactics but we do not torture them. If we were at war with a nation, there would be no debate as to our right to collect prisoners of that nation for detention. Since our enemy knows no flag and adheres to no rules of war, we are forced to use tactics outside of the normal scope, but while we are at war with a borderless enemy, we must neutralize him, for the duration if necessary. This enemy declared war on us a long time ago but we did not "accept" this "declaration" because it did not come from a "nation". That was a mistake. These people consider themselves as a nation and we need to change our perception and treat them as such. If they act as infiltrators and spies, we treat them no differently than captured KGB agents. Finally, I am angry at those who undermine our efforts to conduct this war. I am angry at people, who through their words, and efforts contribute to the injury and death of our soldiers, who provide encouragement to the enemy, who weaken our efforts and prolong the war, who, for political gain put our soldiers, our people, and our nation at greater risk. There is a LOT of anger going on. Many times it is inappropriately acted upon. Islamists are angry, so they blow up people. Conservatives are angry so they advocate indiscriminate retaliation. Liberals are angry so they advocate undermining the war. All this anger is misdirected. We can see how the killing of innocents is wrong, but sometimes we cannot see how allowing innocents to be killed is wrong. One should seriously consider the impacts of certain types of dissention in this country before embarking on said dissentious course. I have many issues with the war in Iraq, but I will focus on just a couple. When President Bush pronounced to the world that he would defeat terrorism, he made a promise. He promised that he would not only pursue the terrorists wherever they may be, but he promised to go after the countries that enable those terrorists. When the UN made resolution after resolution against Iraq those too were promises. The difference comes in whether one follows up a promise or not. You see, no one embarks on a major undertaking with the expectation of losing. The choices any person or group are almost always predicated on the fact that the reward exceeds the price or risk. Hitler would not have invaded Czechoslovakia unless he though he could get away with it. He would not have invaded Poland unless he though he could get away with it. The success of those events and reaction of Europe convinced him that he could press on and take all of Europe. Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait unless he thought he could get away with it. He would not have defied the UN unless he though he could get away with it. In those cases, the acting party decided that they could attain their goals using the methods employed. The same thing goes for the terrorists. They methods they employ are based on the expectation of ultimate success. The methods they employ are also based on their own capabilities, capabilities that stem from the support of governments both passive and active, the support of moneyed benefactors, and the support of powerful influencers such as media and high profile personalities. This brings me back to promises made. Part of the reason these terrorists became so bold is that there were few significant reprisals for their actions. In the same way Hitler moved on Poland and Hussein defied the UN, Al Qaeda flew planes into our buildings. Ultimately it was because they could and that the reprisals had insufficient deterrent effect. Now, when President Bush announced that he would pursue the nations that supported terrorism, he basically set the stage for action. The choice was, rattle the saber and hope it is enough, or draw the saber and demonstrate our commitment to living up to our promises. It is fair to debate whether Iraq was the best choice for an operation, but the stage had also been set there as well. With promises being made at the UN, the choice was to continue to prove that promises meant nothing or to prove that they did. I believe that the lack of consequences in the past was a key factor in the terrorist activity leading up to and including 9/11. Without the resolve to back up our promises, our enemies will be emboldened to act. It does not get any simpler than that. Iraq was a promise kept. Now, some people want us to renege on that promise and others. That is a dangerous position to be advocating. The thing is, the debate about Iraq belongs BEFORE we took action. And that debate DID occur. It occurred BEFORE the war. And the result was overwhelmingly in FAVOR of action. The congress granted President Bush the authority to act. The fact that they did not like his decision is moot. If they did not trust his ability to act, they were wrong to have given him the authority to do so. NOW they are wrong for challenging his decision after the fact. That brings us back to the concept of one's expectation of the results of one's actions. In many cases throughout history, the winner of a conflict was not always the one with the bigger army, the better equipment, and the best trained, or any of those factors. The winner quite often was the one with the greater will to win. Wars are won by will in far greater weight then in anything else. I would say that will is THE determining factor in success in any conflict. Obviously will is not enough. A greater force can sap the will of another army, but not always. The revolutionary war was won by will, not by military might. Vietnam was lost by will not by military might. And, Iraq will be won or lost by will alone. The consequences of this outcome will have long lasting impacts on the security of our nation. At this point, it does not matter whether we should have gone into Iraq. The fact is we are there now. We either complete the job and fulfill our promises to rebuild that nation and leave it with a stable and free society or we cut and run and have the world know with certainty that our word is null and void and that we have no resolve. That is the stakes. That is the goal of the terrorists: to prove they have resolve, to prove that we do not. Their victory will ensure increased attacks on all nations because the terrorists will have unimpeachable proof that their tactics will ultimately succeed. Bombings, beheadings, gross atrocities will be the weapons of choice in the future. Tactics that have been proven to bring down the mighty. If will is the factor that determines the outcome, then will is the place where we must consider here and now. As far as our enemy is concerned, we MUST make them believe that they cannot succeed. We MUST make them sure that WE will prevail. We MUST prove to them that their tactics are ineffectual. There is a down side to that. Once an enemy realizes their tactics are not succeeding, they will change them. With an enemy of this nature, that could result in greater atrocities than we have yet seen. Yet, even then we must prevail. We must continue to demonstrate OUR resolve and OUR willingness to see this to the end and DEFEAT them. Since they have shown little regard for decency and life, since they have shown that our very existence is provocation to them, no amount of diplomacy or concessions will achieve an end satisfactory to our nation. The only solution is the demonstration of our willingness to defeat them despite their tactics. Our goal is to defeat the will of the enemy. His goal is to defeat ours. Any indication that the enemy's will is faltering will bolster our own will. However, the opposite is true as well. Any indication that our will is faltering will embolden the enemy's will. Unfortunately, from the very first minute of this conflict, parts of our country have shouted from the very mountain tops just how little will they have to win the war. They demonstrate clearly for our enemies that we don't want to fight. They give clear indication that enemy tactics are successful. In effect, they give aid and comfort to the enemy and spur them on to continued fighting because they tell the enemy in clear messages that if they continue in their tactics, the United States will be defeated. As I said before, the debate about whether we go to war is over. We are now at war, and the ONLY debate we should have is on what tactics are most appropriate for prosecuting that war. It is marginally fair to state that you are unhappy about our decision to go to war, but beyond that, anything else will embolden the enemy. Think very long and about what is at stake here. It is almost IMPOSSIBLE to be pro America while actively dissenting on ongoing conflict. It is bordering on treason for a public official to undermine the war effort, the Commander in Chief and the military publicly for all the world to see. We have started down this path, and there are but two choices: to win or to lose. There is no "suing for peace" with this enemy. Now, that does not mean you have to become militaristic and be a war monger. You can be a peacenik, but you need to consider that unless you want to see the United States harmed, you should cease criticism of the war itself until after it is won. There is plenty of time to castigate the people who made what you perceive as errors AFTER we have finished the job. However, if you persist in presenting disunity and a weakened resolve to the enemy, you take direct responsibility for the lives of all Americans, Iraqis and foreign terrorists that will die subsequently. The quickest way to end the war is to be united, to demonstrate unshakable resolve, and to have the enemy surrender. Or, YOU can surrender to the enemy. Anything else will just prolong the killing. This goes infinitely more so for our public leaders. What they do for political gain is completely unconscionable.

#### Challenging the military’s supposed “ideological stronghold” on the academy is EXACTLY the problem—distancing the academy from the military renders the military a pure abstraction in the eyes of academic elites. We must recognize that the US military is a force for good, and our soldiers truly protect freedom here and abroad.

Weldon 5

Curt Weldon (American politician. He served as a Republican member of the United States House of Representatives from 1987 to 2007, representing the 7th district of Pennsylvania). “Liberty’s Duty to Defend Itself.” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, Vol. 19, Issue 1. 2005. <http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1201&context=ndjlepp>

II. SUPPORT THE SPREAD OF FREEDOM TO OTHER NATIONS. Americans should support the spread of freedom to other nations and peoples as a means of making more secure our own liberty, as President Bush is doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are many examples of how expanding the domain of liberty increases American national security. After the defeat of Germany and Japan in the Second World War, their democratization created a more stable world order. Turning these nations away from their militaristic pasts and into democracies made the world a much safer place. Establishing democracy in Germany eliminated a centuries-long basis of conflict in Europe that had been the source of two world wars that threatened liberty globally. Establishing democracy in Japan ended a centuries-long trend of Japanese militarism that, when linked to a modern industrial base, posed a threat globally to liberty that was second only to Nazi Germany. The reconstruction of Japan on democratic lines avoided the bitterness of a vengeful peace, as experienced by Germany after World War I. Endowing the Japanese people with freedom in return freed us from the threat of a vengeance-seeking Japan and made that nation our friend today. The expansion of freedom to Russia is drawing Moscow westward and makes American liberty more secure. Democracy is still young in Russia. The democratic experiment in Russia could still fail. America needs to make a major effort to ensure that democracy succeeds in Russia, so that Russia can take its place alongside the Western democracies as a friend and not relapse into an authoritarian future. If freedom fails in Russia, Moscow could become an ally of totalitarian China and the source of a new Cold War. To advance democracy in Russia, to make our own liberty more secure, I have launched an initiative called "A New Time, A New Beginning," that has the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin."1 "A New Time, A New Beginning" envisions numerous small pilot programs to develop better relations with Russia on all levels: cultural, civil, economic, and military.1 4 It involves seeking areas of cooperation in culture, business, civil affairs, and science on the theory that the building of trust by small steps, and in non-controversial or less controversial areas, can lead to resolution of major differences and cooperation in the most controversial areas of national security and foreign policy.15 "A New Time, A New Beginning" also seeks to help build a free Russia on firm foundations.16 For example, a stable civil society with honest courts and fair laws is an essential prerequisite for a good business climate and a free economy. Prosperity and free enterprise will put Russian democracy on firm foundations. Accordingly, "A New Time, A New Beginning" promotes bringing together American jurists and Russian jurists to work together on constructing in Russia a sound and fair legal system, where contracts are honored and where businesses can trust in the courts. 17 The liberation and democratization of Afghanistan and Iraq, if we succeed, also promises to create a more stable world order and to make our nation and liberties more secure against the threat of terrorism. Whatever our party affiliations, all Americans should support President Bush in his effort to bring freedom to Afghanistan and Iraq to establish democracies in those societies. Despite our long experience that bringing freedom to others also significantly increases our own national security, the United States still does not seem to appreciate that the best pre- emptive defense strategy is the active liberation of other nations. If a bomb or missile existed that could provide to the United States the same level of security as did the transformation into democracies of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, would it not be wise to invest billions into that weapons system? Yet our investment in promoting political and economic freedom as a "weapons system" to defend our liberty is modest, especially considering its proven success. The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Agency for International Development (AID), and other small programs scattered throughout various federal agencies comprise our inadequate commitment to promoting freedom in the world. Most of these programs are not integrated into a national security strategy. President Bush has done a heroic job in Afghanistan and Iraq of liberating countries and attempting to reconstruct them as democratic nations. But reconstructing these nations as democracies is being done on an ad hoc basis. This is not the fault of the Bush administration. It is our collective fault as a nation for our failure to take more seriously the use of liberty as the most effective weapon in our arsenal for providing for our own national security. We would be having a much easier time in Afghanistan and Iraq if there were contingency plans on the shelf, planned out well in advance, for helping these countries become democracies. Just as the United States has contingency plans for winning all manner of possible wars against all possible adversaries, we need contingency plans for winning the peace against possible adversaries by transforming them into democracies and, thus, making our own nation and liberty more secure. Right now, we usually find ourselves with no exit strategy after achieving military victory over adversaries. There should be a standard exit strategy when we are compelled to defeat an authoritarian or totalitarian power completely, as we did in Iraq, rather than leaving the adversary nation in ruins-to leave our defeated foe reconstructed physically and politically on the basis of democracy, as we did in Germany and Japan. Indeed, our national security policy should invest more resources in trying to transform our political adversaries into democracies before war becomes necessary. Accordingly, I am considering introducing new legislation to establish a new institute dedicated to the cause of advancing freedom in the world and so making our own nation and liberty more secure. The Ronald Wilson Reagan Institute for Freedom would have area specialists dedicated to analyzing the prospects for creating programs and strategies to move authoritarian and totalitarian states toward freedom. The Institute would have on the shelf contingency plans for democratizing those countries as part of a larger national security policy in peacetime and as part of an exit strategy in case the United States is compelled to defeat those nations in war. The Institute would coordinate its work with NED, AID, and other freedom agencies. The Institute would keep track of the activities of all agencies dedicated to advancing freedom. The Institute would propose ways to use the resources we spend promoting freedom more efficiently and effectively and as part of a broader national security policy. I am interested in what readers of this Journal think about this idea. III. SUPPORT THE SOLDIER WHO DEFENDS YOUR FREEDOM. Everyone has the right to protest, even during war. But everyone also has the right to disapprove of the protesters, and in terms as strident as those the protesters themselves use. The United States appears to have lost its long tradition of unity during war. In America's past wars there have always been some protesters, but never on the scale and with the serious consequences that attended the protests of the Vietnam War. Vietnam seems to have established a new standard and a new scale of expected American tolerance for protests during war. In the liberal culture and liberal media, the Vietnam War protesters are lionized and treated as heroes. The media wants us to admire the protesters of today. But the ones that deserve our admiration, the people that most Americans rightly admire, are the soldiers and leaders who won our past wars and who are today protecting U.S. national security and preserving our liberty. Protesters during times of war are not the role models I want my children to follow. During the present war on terrorism, people have the right to protest. Yet the protestors and a sympathetic media challenge the right of Americans to protest the protestors. Questioning the wisdom and loyalty of protestors, they complain, has a chilling effect on their free speech. Moreover, today's protestors want it both ways-they want to protest the war on terrorism in Iraq and claim they still support the troops. You cannot protest the war and truthfully claim that you also support the troops. Terrorists know they cannot win on the battlefield. They can only win by breaking the will of the American people, and of America's political leaders, to prosecute the war on terror. When protestors and political partisans accuse President Bush of being a "liar" and call for the withdrawal of our troops from Iraq before freedom is firmly established in that country, inevitably, if unwittingly, they encourage the enemy to think they are winning the war on the political battlefield and, thus, embolden terrorists to fight longer and harder. Further, I fear that as partisan political feeling deepens, we will become a more deeply divided people. I fear that the protestors will turn on American troops and the military the way they did in Vietnam. If the protestors and the liberal media and academia are capable of tolerating lies against President Bush, they are capable of tolerating lies against the military and our citizen-soldiers. The hysterical rhetoric and epithets being hurled at President Bush today, faithfully reported everyday by the liberal media, may well be directed at our troops tomorrow. The Framers of the Constitution lived in a different America of small towns and closely knit communities defended by militia, citizen-soldiers. The social intimacy of that bygone society made people more circumspect about the consequences of protesting war, after war had begun. Failure to support the troops meant endangering husbands, sons, kin, and neighbors. Now we have a larger, less connected, more divided society-a more specialized society too, where academics and highly paid journalists do not mix with our soldiers, perhaps do not want to know them. For many Americans who have never served in the military and who have no personal ties to the military, our soldiers and our military institutions are an abstraction, and not an abstraction well-understood or respected.

#### Distancing the military from the academy encourages selective readings of history and uninformed knowledge about our soldiers—this is a direct threat to our security

**Gorman 9**

Captain B. J. Gorman. “The Importance of Civil-Military Relations And the Future of the United States As a World Superpower.” February 20th, 2009.

Counterarguments Some will argue that a close relationship between our military and policy makers prevents elected representatives from making unbiased decisions on the security of our nation. 12 Advocacy against bridging the gap is primarily from extreme leftist groups; however, some of the country’s respected liberal elites argue that placing service members in advisory roles within our government creates undue influence on elected officials, thus taking away the power of the people to influence decisions. The argument is based on the premise that military leaders are in service to follow orders, not make policy. Many of the oppositions to creating a strong bond between the public and military is based around the false understanding that it will create a military that controls government decisions. The underlying premise is flawed at all levels. There is little threat in the U.S. of a military overthrow, and advisors to elected officials do not make policy. Nevertheless, many of the country’s liberal elites fight to distance military presence in our communities, schools, and the government. Unfortunately, those liberal elites often carry great credibility with the public, not only on their subject matter expertise in economics, social sciences, or education, but on their military views. Other arguments against forming closer relations between the military and the public are based on misinformed perceptions of our military leaders. These perceptions are largely formed on selective history, uninformed knowledge of military training, and sensitivity to war in general. Opposition is often founded on the simple misperception that those within the military will always favor war over peace. The U.S. military’s separation from the public since the Vietnam War has only made it more difficult for the public to discern the necessity of a strong military force, yet at no point since the Revolutionary War has a strong military force been more relevant in this country’s history. Closing The Global War on Terrorism and shifting world powers have created a unique challenge for U.S. foreign policy, creating unforeseen pressure on diplomatic, economic, military, and social influence around the globe. Wrong or right, U.S. military forces have been used around the world at an increasing rate to influence political goals, for humanitarian relief, crisis intervention, and full-scale war. At the same time, the gap in civil-military relations has reached a critical divide. With civilian leaders relying on the armed forces to perform an increasing number of duties, the military must reconnect with the public. The U.S. military’s projection of force must be grounded in a well-educated public who can provide support and guidance to military leaders. Failure to close the current civil-military gap will undermine U.S. foreign policy and weaken the security of the country.

### 1NC- War- BIW + Barrett

#### US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises

**Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13** (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### Hegemony solves extinction

**Barret 11** [Thomas P.M. Barnett 11 Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads]

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by¶ engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force.¶As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head.The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.¶To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

### 1NC- SV- TL

#### Liberal order is really good – solves violence and poverty – stats.

**Wyne 15** 3/16/15 [Ali, researcher at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-wyne/the-world-is-becoming-saf\_b\_6878664.html]

There are plenty of reasons to despair about the state of the world: ISIL's depredations in the Middle East, Boko Haram's atrocities in Nigeria, and Russia's slow-drip incursion into Ukraine are just a few. These phenomena are more distressing when one considers that they're occurring against the backdrop of an eroding postwar order. Contrary to the oft-heard refrain, though, that the world is becoming more dangerous -- or, according to some observers, has never been more dangerous -- it has actually never been safer. Steven Pinker and Andrew Mack recently documented the declines in global rates of homicide, violence against women, genocide, and war, among other categories. We're also becoming more prosperous. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, real global GDP more than tripled between 1970 and 2010, and real global GDP per capita nearly doubled. Last month the Economist reported that the percent of the world's population living in "abject poverty" fell from 36 in 1990 to 18 in 2010 (translating to about 900 million people who escaped that condition). Finally, we're living longer, better lives. The University of Washington's Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation found that "global life expectancy increased by 5.8 years for men and 6.6 years for women" between 1990 and 2013. According to the United Nations, moreover, the mortality rate for children under five fell from 90 per thousand births to 46 during that same period, while the percent of the world's population that is "clinically malnourished" fell more than seven points. It's no accident the world is becoming safer, wealthier and healthier: there are extraordinary people around the world who're trying to make it better. Too often, though, their names remain unknown; their contributions, unacknowledged. "What's Working" is a crucial platform for spotlighting them. When the news of the day feels overwhelming, I take comfort in three facts. First, the ingenuity of our minds has always scaled with the magnitude of our calling. There's no reason to believe it won't continue doing so. Second, we're pushing forward the frontiers of possibility every second, far more rapidly than we can comprehend. Before coming to MIT, I believed certain problems were simply too hard for human beings to address. In retrospect, though, my skepticism simply reflected my failure of imagination. I now assume that once a problem has been identified, folks will eventually solve it or find a way to manage it. The tipping point for me came six years ago, when MIT News ran an article discussing a new project Professor Angela Belcher and a few of her colleagues had undertaken. "For the first time," it explained, "MIT researchers have shown they can genetically engineer viruses to build both the positively and negatively charged ends of a lithium-ion battery." If we can figure out how to make batteries from viruses -- I never imagined I'd see those two words in the same sentence, and I still can't get my head around the idea -- what can't we do? Third, no matter what problem keeps you up at night, there are brilliant, passionate people around the world who're working on it. You may not hear about them amid **the daily barrage of depressing headlines**, but they're easy to find if you want to find them. Among the extraordinary individuals I've met, spoken to over e-mail, or reconnected with in recent months: Ruzwana Bashir, the cofounder and CEO of Peek, who's using her own experience of sexual abuse to help other victims find their voices; Pardis Sabeti, a professor of organismic and evolutionary biology at Harvard, who's developing treatments to fight Ebola; Donald Sadoway, a professor of materials chemistry at MIT, whose work on liquid-metal batteries could revolutionize electricity storage; Shiza Shahid, the cofounder of the Malala Fund, who's working to give young women around the world a chance at an education; and Wes Moore, author of The Other Wes Moore and The Work, who cofounded BridgeEdU to help at-risk youth in Baltimore graduate from college. There's an enormous amount of work to be done -- slowing the course of climate change, feeding a growing population and resettling tens of millions of refugees, to name but a few challenges -- but dwelling on everything that's wrong and fretting about **everything that could go wrong won't help. Let's spend less time lamenting the state of the world and more time supporting those who're making it better.**

### 1NC- War- Deterrence + Resolve

#### Retrenchment signals for competition whichcauses nuclear conflict and arms races that triggers war

**Grygiel and Mitchell 16** — Jakub Grygiel, PhD in Politics from Princeton, Associate Professor in IR at Johns Hopkins, former consultant for the OECD and the World Bank, former editor of the Journal of Public and International Affairs, Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington, DC, and A. Wess Mitchell, President of the Center for European Policy Analysis, former member of the National Security Transition Team for Romney, member of the Advisory Board for the Lugar Institute for Diplomacy, co-authors of The Unquiet Frontier, 2016 (“Predators on the Frontier,” The American Interest, Vol. 11, No. 5, February 12th, Available Online at <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/02/12/predators-on-the-frontier/>)

Revisionist powers are on the move. ‎From eastern Ukraine and the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea, large rivals of the United States are modernizing their military forces, grabbing strategic real estate, and threatening vulnerable U.S. allies. Their goal is not just to assert hegemony over their neighborhoods but to rearrange the global security order as we have known it since the end of the Second World War. We first wrote about these emerging dynamics in 2010, and then in TAI in 2011. We argued three things. First, that revisionist powers were using a strategy of “probing”: a combination of assertive diplomacy and small but bold military actions to test the outer reaches of American power and in particular the resilience of frontier allies. Second, we argued that the small, exposed allies who were the targets of these probes were likely to respond by developing back-up options to U.S. security guarantees, whether through military self-help or accommodation. And third, we argued that that China and Russia were learning from one another’s probes in their respective regions, and that allies themselves were drawing conclusions about U.S. deterrence in their own neighborhood from how America handled similarly situated allies elsewhere. Five years later, as we argue in a new book released this month, these dynamics have intensified dramatically. Revisionist powers are indeed probing the United States, but their methods have become bolder, more violent—and successful. Allies have grown more alert to this pressure, amid the steady whittling away of neighboring buffer zones, and have begun to pursue an array of self-help schemes ranging from arms build-ups to flirtations with the nearby revisionist power. It has become harder for the United States to isolate security crises to one region: Russia’s land-grabs in Eastern Europe provide both a model and distraction effect for China to accelerate its maritime claims in the South China Sea; Poland’s quest for U.S. strategic reassurance unnerves and spurs allies in the Persian Gulf and Western Pacific. By degrees, the world is entering the path to war. Not since the 1980s have the conditions been riper for a major international military crisis. Not since the 1930s has the world witnessed the emergence of multiple large, predatory states determined to revise the global order to their advantage—if necessary by force. At a minimum, the United States in coming years could face the pressure of managing several deteriorating regional security spirals; at a maximum, it could be confronted with a Great Power war against one, and possibly two or even three, nuclear-armed peer competitors. In either case, the U.S. military could face these scenarios without either the presumption of technological overmatch or favorable force ratios that it has enjoyed against its rivals for the past several decades. How should the United States respond to these dynamics? As our rivals grow more aggressive and our military edge narrows, we must look to other methods for waging and winning geopolitical competitions in the 21st century. The most readily available but underutilized tool at our disposal is alliances. America’s frontline allies offer a mechanism by which it can contain rivals—indeed, this was the original purpose for cultivating security linkages with small states in the world’s rimland regions to begin with. In coming years, the value of strategically placed allies near Eurasia’s large land powers will grow as our relative technological or numerical military strength shrinks. The time has come for the United States to develop a grand strategy for containing peer competitors centered on the creative use of frontline allies. It must do so now, before geopolitical competition intensifies. Predatory Peers Probing has been the strategy of choice for America’s modern rivals to challenge the existing order. Over the past few years, Russia, China, and, to a degree, Iran have sensed that the United States is retreating in their respective regions—whether out of choice, fatigue, weakness, or all three combined. But they are unsure of how much remaining strength the United States has, or of the solidity of its commitments to allies. Rather than risking direct war, they have employed low-intensity crises to test U.S. power in these regions. Like past revisionists, they have focused their probes on seemingly secondary interests of the leading power, either by humbling its weakest allies or seizing gray zones over which the United States is unlikely to fight. These probes test the United States on the outer rim of its influence, where the revisionist’s own interests are strongest while the U.S. is at its furthest commitments and therefore most vulnerable to defeat. Russia has launched a steady sequence of threatening military moves against vulnerable NATO allies and conducted limited offensives against former Soviet satellite states. China has sought out low-intensity diplomatic confrontations with small U.S. security clients, erected military no-go zones, and asserted claims over strategic waterways. When we wrote about this behavior in The American Interest in 2011, it was composed mainly of aggressive diplomacy or threatening but small military moves. But the probes of U.S. rivals are becoming bolder. Sensing a window of opportunity, in 2014 Russia upped the ante by invading Ukraine—the largest country in Eastern Europe—in a war that has so far cost 7,000 lives and brought 52,000 square kilometers of territory into the Russian sphere of influence. After years of using unmarked fishing trawlers to harass U.S. or allied naval vessels, China has begun to militarize its probes in the South China Sea, constructing seven artificial islands and claiming (and threatening to fight over) 1.8 million square kilometers of ocean. Iran has recently humiliated the United States by holding American naval vessels and broadcasting photos of surrendering U.S. sailors. In all cases, revisionist powers increased the stakes because they perceived their initial probes to have succeeded. Having achieved modest gains, they increased the intensity of their probes. The strategic significance of these latest probes for the United States is twofold. First, they have substantially increased the military pressure on frontline allies. The presence of a buffer zone of some sort, whether land or sea, between allies like Poland or Japan and neighboring revisionist powers, helped to reduce the odds of sustained contact and confrontation between allied and rival militaries. By successfully encroaching on or invading these middle spaces, revisionists have advanced the zone of contest closer to the territory of U.S. allies, increasing the potential for a deliberate or accidental military clash. Second, the latest probes have significantly raised the overall pressure on the United States. As long as Russia’s military adventures were restricted to its own southern periphery, America could afford to shift resources to the Pacific without worrying much about the consequences in Europe—an important consideration given the Pentagon’s jettisoning of the goal to be able to fight a two-front war. With both Ukraine and the South China Sea at play (and with a chaotic Middle East, where another rival, Iran, advances its reach and influence), the United States no longer has the luxury of prioritizing one region over another; with two re-militarized frontiers at opposite ends of the globe, it must continually weigh trade-offs in scarce military resources between geographic theaters. This disadvantage is not lost on America’s rivals, or its most exposed friends. Frontier Frenzy The intensification of probing has reverberated through the ranks of America’s frontline allies. In both Europe and Asia, the edges of the Western order are inhabited by historically vulnerable small or mid-sized states that over the past seven decades have relied on the United States for their existence. The similarities in the geopolitical position and strategic options of states like Estonia and Taiwan, or Poland and South Korea, are striking. For all of these states, survival depends above all on the sustainability of U.S. extended deterrence, in both its nuclear and conventional forms. This in turn rests on two foundations: the assumption among rivals and allies alike that the United States is physically able to fulfill its security obligations to even the smallest ally, and the assumption that it is politically willing to do so. Doubts about both have been growing for many years. Reductions in American defense spending are weakening the U.S. military capability to protect allies. Due to cuts introduced by the 2009 Budget Control Act, the U.S. Navy is smaller than at any point since before the First World War, the U.S. Army is smaller than at any point since before the Second World War and the U.S. Air Force has the lowest number of operational warplanes in its history. Nuclear force levels are static or declining, and the U.S. technological edge over rivals in important weapons types has diminished. The Pentagon in 2009 announced that for the first time since the Second World War it would jettison the goal of being able to conduct a two-front global war. At the same time that U.S. capabilities are decreasing, those of our rivals are increasing. Both Russia and China have undertaken large, multiyear military expansion and modernization programs and the technological gap between them and the United States is narrowing, particularly in key areas such as short-range missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, and fifth-generation fighter aircraft. Recent American statecraft has compounded the problem by weakening the belief in U.S. political will to defend allies. The early Obama Administration’s public questioning of the value of traditional alliances as “alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War” shook allied confidence at the same time that its high-profile engagement with large rivals indicated a preference for big-power bargaining over the heads of small states. The U.S.-Russia “reset” seemed to many allies both transactional and freewheeling, and left a lasting impression of the suddenness with which U.S. priorities could shift from one Administration to the next. This undermined the predictability of patronage that is the sine qua non of effective deterrence for any Great Power. As the revisionists’ probes have become more assertive and U.S. credibility less firm, America’s frontier allies have started to reconsider their national security options. Five years ago, many frontline states expressed security concerns, began to seek greater military capabilities, or looked to offset risk by engaging diplomatically with revisionists. But for the most part, such behavior was muted and well within the bounds of existing alliance commitments. However, as probing has picked up pace, allied coping behavior has become more frantic. In Europe, Poland, the Baltic States, and Romania have initiated military spending increases. In Asia, littoral U.S. allies are engaged in a worrisome regional arms race. In both regions, the largest allies are considering offensive capabilities to create conventional deterrence. Their willingness to build up their indigenous military capabilities is overall a positive development, but it carries risks, too, spurring dynamics that were absent over the past decades. The danger is that, absent a consistent and credible U.S. overwatch, rearming allies engage in a chaotic acquisition strategy, poorly anchored in the larger alliance. Fearing abandonment, such states may end up detaching themselves from the alliance simply by pursuing independent security policies. There is also danger on the other side of the spectrum of possible responses by frontline allies. Contrary to the hopeful assumptions of offshore balancers, not all frontline allies are resisting. Some are choosing strategies of accommodation. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia in Europe and Thailand and Malaysia in Asia are all examples of nominal U.S. allies that are trying to avoid antagonizing the stronger predator. Worsening regional security dynamics create domestic political pressures to avoid confrontation with the nearby revisionist power. Full-fledged bandwagoning in the form of the establishment of new alliances is not yet visible, but hedging is. Seeds of Disorder The combination of intensifying probes and fragmenting alliances threatens to unravel important components of the stability of major regions and the wider international order. Allowed to continue on their current path, security dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific could lead to negative or even catastrophic outcomes for U.S. national security. One increasingly likely near-term scenario is a simmering, simultaneous security competition in major regions. In such a scenario, rivals continue probing allies and grabbing middle-zone territory while steering clear of war with the United States or its proxies; allies continue making half-measure preparations without becoming fully capable of managing their own security; and the United States continues feeding greater and greater resources into frontline regions without achieving reassurance, doggedly tested and put in doubt by the revisionists. Through a continued series of probes, the revisionist powers maintain the initiative while the United States and its allies play catch up. The result might be a gradual hardening of the U.S. security perimeter that never culminates in a Great Power war but generates many of the negative features of sustained security competition—arms races, proxy wars, and cyber and hybrid conflicts—that erode the bases of global economic growth. A second, graver possibility is war. Historically, a lengthy series of successful probes has often culminated in a military confrontation. One dangerous characteristic of today’s international landscape is that not one but two revisionists have now completed protracted sequences of probes that, from their perspective, have been successful. If the purpose of probing is to assess the top power’s strength, today’s probes could eventually convince either Russia, China, or both that the time is ripe for a more definitive contest. It is uncertain what the outcome would be. Force ratios in today’s two hotspots, the Baltic Sea and South China Sea, do not favor the United States. Both Russia and China possess significant anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities, with a ten-to-one Russian troop advantage in the Baltic and massive Chinese preponderance of coastal short-range missiles in the South China Sea. Moreover, both powers possess nuclear weapons and, in Russia’s case, a doctrine favoring their escalatory use for strategic effect. And even if the United States can maintain overwhelming military superiority in a dyadic contest, war is always the realm of chance and a source of destruction that threatens the stability of the existing international order. Having failed a series of probes, the United States could face the prospect of either a short, sharp war that culminates in nuclear attack or an economically costly protracted two-front conflict. Either outcome would definitely alter the U.S.-led international system as we know it. A third, long-term possibility is a gradual eviction of the United States from the rimland regions. This could occur either through a military defeat, as described above, or through the gradual hollowing out of U.S. regional alliances due to the erosion of deterrence and alliance defection—and therefore this scenario is not mutually exclusive of the previous two. For the United States, this would be geopolitically disastrous, involving a loss of position in the places where America must be present to prevent the risk of hemispheric isolation. Gaining a foothold in the Eurasian rimlands has been a major, if not the most important, goal of U.S. grand strategy for a century. It is through this presence that the United States is able to shape global politics and avoid the emergence of mortal threats to itself. Without such a presence, America’s largest rivals would be able to steadily aggrandize, building up enlarged spheres of influence, territory, and resources that would render them capable of sustained competition for global primacy. Unlike in the 20th century, current A2AD and nuclear technology would make a military reentry into these regions difficult if not impossible.

### 1NC- Resilient

#### Heg resilient and no impact

Ikenberry 11 [May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show]

Pronouncements of American decline miss the real transformation under way today. What is occurring is not American decline but a dynamic process in which other states are catching up and growing more connected. In an open and rule-based international order, this is what happens. If the architects of the postwar liberal order were alive to see today's system, they would think that their vision had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Markets and democracy have spread. Societies outside the West are trading and growing. The United States has more alliance partners today than it did during the Cold War. Rival hegemonic states with revisionist and illiberal agendas have been pushed off the global stage. It is difficult to read these world-historical developments as a story of American decline and liberal unraveling. In a way, however, the liberal international order has sown the seeds of its own discontent, since, paradoxically, the challenges facing it now -- the rise of non-Western states and new transnational threats -- are artifacts of its success. But the solutions to these problems -- integrating rising powers and tackling problems cooperatively -- will lead the order's old guardians and new stakeholders to an agenda of renewal. The coming divide in world politics will not be between the United States (and the West) and the non-Western rising states. Rather, the struggle will be between those who want to renew and expand today's system of multilateral governance arrangements and those who want to move to a less cooperative order built on spheres of influence. These fault lines do not map onto geography, nor do they split the West and the non-West. There are passionate champions of the UN, the WTO, and a rule-based international order in Asia, and there are isolationist, protectionist, and anti-internationalist factions in the West. The liberal international order has succeeded over the decades because its rules and institutions have not just enshrined open trade and free markets but also provided tools for governments to manage economic and security interdependence. The agenda for the renewal of the liberal international order should be driven by this same imperative: to reinforce the capacities of national governments to govern and achieve their economic and security goals. As the hegemonic organization of the liberal international order slowly gives way, more states will have authority and status. But this will still be a world that the United States wants to inhabit. A wider array of states will share the burdens of global economic and political governance, and with its worldwide system of alliances, the United States will remain at the center of the global system. Rising states do not just grow more powerful on the global stage; they grow more powerful within their regions, and this creates its own set of worries and insecurities -- which is why states will continue to look to Washington for security and partnership. In this new age of international order, the United States will not be able to rule. But it can still lead.

#### Influence is inevitable but unipolarity isn’t—Ikenberry indicates that relative power is inevitable—

#### a. Markets and democracy have spread

#### b. Revolutionary states have been pushed off the global stage

#### c. Interdependence has made heg obsolete

#### Heg is sustainable; current strategy allows for defense cuts and doesn’t require a larger budget

**Brooks et al 12**

Stephen G. Brooks (Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College), G. John Ikenberry (Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University), and William Wohlforth (Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College). “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment.” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 3. Winter 2012. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3703\_Brooks%20Wohlforth%20Ikenberry.pdf

The other term in the cost equation—the budgetary demands of deep engagement—is also a moving target. Retrenchment advocates tend to write as if post–September 11 levels of defense spending are necessary to maintain the deep engagement strategy, but it is already clear that this is not the case. After the September 11 attacks, defense spending increased dramatically, owing in large part to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, not all of the increased defense spending since September 11 resulted from the costly occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan; a significant portion of the increase was caused by an augmented effort to field and use military tools in the wider war on terrorism. Both of these drivers of increased spending during the past decade have already begun to be reversed, as the United States winds down the two costly wars and begins to trim nonwar “base” spending.As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department based planning on cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, maintaining that these reductions would not compromise the national security strategy. A report published by the Center for a New American Security agreed that “America’s global engagement strategy as it is currently articulated” can be sustained with national defense cuts in the $500 billion to $550 billion range.21 As figure 1 shows, these cuts are expected to bring defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) below 3 percent by 2017, even though spending in real terms will be roughly $100 billion higher than the late 1990s.22 Importantly, these figures may not represent the floor for spending to sustain the strategy over the long term: according to many experts, rebalancing security efforts from military to civilian tools and much-discussed reforms to the way the Pentagon does business—including procurement practices and compensation policies—potentially could save significant additional sums.23 Two points about budget costs emerge. First, the United States can sustain the budgetary cost of deep engagement, even if a future administration should decide to increase funding substantially. Even the largest defense increase seriously discussed in the 2012 presidential campaign would not bring military spending as a share of GDP back to its 2011 level. Given the vast gap in military capabilities between the United States and China, the absence of real counterbalancing (discussed below), and the fact that deep engagement has made U.S. allies of most of the world’s most advanced and capable military powers, China’s economic rise will not demand a dramatic increase in U.S. military efforts anytime soon.24 To be sure, the politics of the defense budget may well become contentious in a tough fiscal climate.25 However, that prospect hardly means that deep engagement cannot be sustained. Rather, it underlines the increased importance of the grand strategy debate this article seeks to advance.

#### Cost savings from retrenchment are too uncertain and modest at best

**Brooks et al 12**

Stephen G. Brooks (Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College), G. John Ikenberry (Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University), and William Wohlforth (Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College). “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment.” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 3. Winter 2012. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3703\_Brooks%20Wohlforth%20Ikenberry.pdf

Speaking for many retrenchment advocates, Christopher Layne maintains that “the nation’s ballooning budget deficits are going to make it increasingly difficult to sustain [the United States’] level of military commitments.... [I]ts strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them.”16 The budgetary cost of deep engagement is the difference between the expenditures the strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement. The problem is that there are no consensus estimates for either number. This challenge is particularly acute concerning the cost of the grand strategy that would replace retrenchment. Critics of deep engagement develop strong general arguments about the costs and risks of maintaining alliance commitments, but they typically leave unclear exactly what to do about them. Should all alliances and security commitments be summarily abrogated? If so, the savings would be significant. CATO Institute analysts Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan estimate that this alternative—revoking all U.S. security guarantees and alliances, bringing all overseas deployed troops home, reconfiguring the navy to “surge to fight rare wars rather than patrol the world in the name of stability,” decommissioning large numbers of personnel in all branches, slashing the nuclear deterrent force, and dramatically scaling back weapons procurement—would save some $900 billion over ten years.17 Few advocates of retrenchment are so specific, and fewer still unambiguously endorse the idea of reverting to the pre–World War II strategy of an “insular, maritime power” with limited reach beyond the Western Hemisphere. A decision to abandon allies and partners, close bases, shed personnel on a large scale, and trim major defense infrastructure would be exceedingly hard to reverse, dramatically raising the costs should the United States ever decide that an overseas intervention were necessary. Few retrenchment advocates appear sufficiently confident that no such overseas interventions will ever be necessary to recommend such a course.18 Instead, their criticisms of deep engagement are usually accompanied by calls for “restraint,” “offshore balancing,” or “over the horizon” strategies rather than a wholesale abandonment of all major U.S. commitments. These strategies vary along two dimensions: force structure (decommissioning vs. redeployment home; downsizing vs. shifting from Army/Marines to Navy; eliminating the U.S. overseas military footprint everywhere or just in selected regions, etc.); and security commitments (whether to maintain commitments but defend them from offshore; cut some commitments but not all; or cut all commitments).19 The budgetary savings that such strategies would yield are unclear. They depend on which security commitments are to be abandoned outright and over what period of time, how U.S. allies would respond, and how much it would cost to make the remaining commitments credible from an over-the-horizon stance. If the alternative strategy requires keeping a similarly sized force in the United States, then the expected savings are modest given that host governments generally cover many infrastructure costs of U.S. forces and bases. And if it requires the maintenance of major expeditionary capacity, again, the savings, if any, might be modest owing to the need for continued or even enhanced investment in the kinds of weapons platforms that now eat up so much of the defense budget.20 Until retrenchment advocates provide more specifics, the most that can be said is that their alternatives might promise some savings, though considerably less than full strategic disengagement.

## Case

### Framing

#### Reducing the risk of extinction by a tiny amount outweighs massive structural violence on reversibility

**Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. [http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdf](http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.pdf)]Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential  catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of  reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost   certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

#### Death outweighs – loss of value to life is subjective and always reversible. Don't consign people to death because the aff thinks they have no value – preserve the possibility of future happiness

#### Moral realism is true- pain and pleasure are only intrinsic values

**Gray 09** [Gray, James W. "An Argument for Moral Realism." Ethical Realism. N.p., 07 Oct. 2009. Web. 04 Sept. 2015. <https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/an-argument-for-moral-realism/>. MA in philosophy from San Jose State University (2008)]

**If we have evidence** that **anything** in particular **has intrinsic value**, then we also have evidence that **moral realism is true**. Our experiences of pleasure and pain are probably the most powerful evidence of intrinsic value because such experiences are tied to our belief that they have intrinsic value. My argument that pain has intrinsic disvalue is basically the following: We experience that pain is bad. We experience that pain is important. The disvalue of pain is irreducible. The disvalue of pain is real. If pain is bad in the sense of being important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. Therefore, pain has intrinsic disvalue. I am not certain that the premises are true, but I currently find good reasons for accepting them. Therefore, we have reason for accepting the conclusion. The conclusion could be read saying, “We have reason to believe that pain has intrinsic disvalue.” If we accept that **pain has intrinsic disvalue**, then we will simultaneously accept moral realism.1 In order to examine the plausibility of my argument, I will examine each of the premises: We experience that pain is bad. We know pain is bad **because of our experience** of it. If someone described their pain as extremely wonderful, we would doubt they are feeling pain. Either the person is lying or doesn’t know what the word “pain” means. When a child decides not to touch fire because it causes pain, we understand the justification. **It would be strange to ask** the child, “So what? **What’s wrong with pain**?” We experience that pain is important. If pain is important in the relevant sense, then it can provide us reason to do something without merely helping us fulfill our desires. In other words, we must accept the following: The badness of pain isn’t just an instrumental value. The badness of **pain is a final end**. Pain’s badness isn’t an instrumental value – Pain’s disvalue is not an instrumental disvalue because pain can be quite useful to us. **Pain** can tell us when we are unhealthy or injured. We evolved pain because **i**t’**s** **essential** **to** our **survival**. Pain’s bad for a different kind of reason. Pain’s disvalue is found in our negative experience, and this is why pain is a candidate for having an intrinsic disvalue. Whenever someone claims that something has intrinsic value, we need to make sure that it’s not just good because it’s instrumentally valuable. If it’s merely useful at bringing about something else, then it’s not good in and of itself (as intrinsic values are). Pain is perhaps the perfect example of something that is useful but bad. If usefulness was the only kind of value, then pain would actually be good because it helps us in many ways. Pain’s badness isn’t just our dislike of pain – We dislike **pain** because it **feels bad**.2 If pain didn’t feel bad, then we wouldn’t have such a strong desire to avoid intense pain. Pain means “feels bad” and it **is manifested in various experiences**, such as touching fire. **We have to know the meaning of “bad”** in order to understand pain at all. **We attain an understanding of “bad” just by feeling pain**. If pain was only bad because we dislike it, then we couldn’t say that “pain really matters.” Instead, the badness of pain would just be a matter of taste. However, we don’t just say pain is bad because we dislike it. We also say pain is bad because of how it feels. Avoiding **pain is a final end** – A final end is a goal people recognize as being **worthy of being sought after for its own sake**. Money is not a final end **because** it is only valuable when used to do something else. Pleasure and pain-avoidance are final ends because they are taken t be worthy of being avoided for their own sake. We know that avoiding pain makes sense even when **it doesn’t lead to anything else** of value, so avoiding pain is a final end.3 If I want to take an aspirin, someone could ask, “Why did you do that?” I could answer, “I have a headache.” This should be the end of the story. We understand that avoiding pain makes sense. It would be absurd for someone to continue to question me and say, “What difference does having a headache make? That’s not a good reason to take an aspirin!”4 Both realists and anti-realists can agree that pain is bad, and they can both agree that pain is a final end. Our desire to avoid pain is non-instrumental and such a desire is experienced as justified. (However, the ant-realist might argue that it is only taken to be justified because of human psychology.) If pain is a final end, then we understand (a) that pain is important and (b) it makes sense to say that we ought to avoid pain. **Pain’s disvalue is irreducible**. **If the badness of pain was reducible to nonmoral properties, then we should be able to describe what** “bad” means **through a non-moral description**. **However**, **we** currently **have no** way of understanding pain’s badness as being something else. We can’t describe pain’s badness in non-moral terms. If someone needs to know what ” bad” means, they need to experience something bad. To say that some moral states are irreducible is just like saying that some mental states are irreducible. Pain itself can’t be described through a non-mental description. If we told people the mental states involved with pain, they would still not know what pain is because they need to know what it feels like. Someone could argue that **“bad” means the same thing as** something like **“pain,”** and then we would find out that the badness of pain could be reduced to something else. However, pain and the badness of pain are conceptually separable. For example, I could find out that something else is bad other than pain. They could then reply that “bad” means the same thing as a disjunction of various other bad things, such as “pain or malicious intent.” But people who disagree about what constitutes what is “bad” aren’t just arguing about the meaning of the word “bad.” They are arguing about what has the property “bad.”5 Additionally, the word “bad” would no longer have any importance. If “bad” just means “pain or malicious intent,” then why care about it? Why ought I refrain from causing pain or having a malicious intent? It could be that we can find out that “bad” and “pain” are identical, but then “bad” might not be entirely reducible to “pain” (or a disjunction of bad things). We might still think that there are two legitimate descriptions at work. The “pain” description and the “bad” description. (Some people think water is H2O through an identity relation similar to this.) This sort of irreducible identity relation require us to deny that pain is “important.” (If the identity theory did require us to deny that pain is “important,” then we would have a good reason to reject such an identity theory.) I have given reason to think the word “bad” is irreducible, but I haven’t proven it. If someone could prove that pain isn’t important, and we can reduce pain to something else, then I will be proven wrong. I just don’t see any reason to agree with that position at this time. I discuss the badness of pain as irreducible in more detail in my essays “Objection to Moral Realism Part 1: Is/Ought Gap” and “Objections to Moral Realism Part 3: Argument from Queerness.” The badness of pain is real. **If the badness of pain is real**, **then everyone’s pain is bad**. Pain isn’t bad just for me, but not for you. It states that **we don’t** all merely **share a subjective preference** in avoiding pain, **but** that pain’s badness is something worthy of being avoided and helping others avoid it. Why does it seem reasonable to believe pain’s badness to be real? There are at least four reasons. One, I experience that **my pain hurts and I know that other people do as well**. Two, it’s not just people’s subjective preferences in question. People hate pain because of how it feels. Three, people’s pain exists (and if pain exists, then the badness of the pain exists). Four, I see no reason to deny that the badness of other people’s pain exists. I will discuss this final consideration in more detail when I discuss anti-realist objections. We have no good reason to deny that pain is bad. We experience that pain is bad for ourselves, and other people experience that pain is bad for themselves as well. **Even though pain is subjective,** there is nothing delusional about our belief that pain is bad. **It’s not just a** personal **like or a dislike**. We don’t just agree to treat other people’s pain as important as part of a social contract. The belief that the badness of pain is real and “pain is bad no matter who experiences it” will be rejected by anti-realists. If I gave food to the hungry, it would be absurd to question why I did it. Imagine someone who disagrees with my action and says, “Other people’s pain is irrelevant. You should only try to avoid pain for yourself, so feeding the hungry is stupid.” This person’s position is counterintuitive to the point of absurdity. We have all accepted that other people’s pain matters. It makes sense to feed the hungry, it makes sense to give to charity, and it makes sense to give someone an aspirin who has a headache. We don’t have to benefit from helping other people. To deny that “pain is bad no matter who experiences it” isn’t a position that many people can find acceptable. (I suppose some sociopaths might find it acceptable.) If pain is bad, important, irreducible, and real, then pain has intrinsic disvalue. I want to suggest this premise to be justified in virtue of the very meaning of intrinsic value. If pain is bad, important (worthy of being desired), irreducible, and real; then I think we have already established that pain has intrinsic disvalue by definition. We have established **moral facts** that could **give us what we ought to do**, such as, “We ought to avoid pain.” Such an ought judgment is not merely based on my personal belief or desire; it’s based on the fact that pain is important no matter who experiences it. Conclusion: Pain has intrinsic disvalue If my premises are true, then the conclusion follows. I have given reason for accepting the premises, so we have some reason for accepting the conclusion, and the conclusion entails the truth of moral realism. I will take all of my premises to be sufficiently justified, but I will consider why someone might decide that the badness of pain “isn’t real.” An anti-realist could attempt to deny that “pain is bad no matter who experiences it.” The strongest evidence that badness is real is the fact that denying it seems to require unjustified philosophical commitments. I will attempt to show that the alternatives are less justified in the next section.

#### We’ve impact turned militarism – it’s not a flawed way of thinking if it’s actually good

#### Counter-bias – their epistemology’s *more* flawed. Excess *fear of surveillance* means Aff scholarship’s MORE of an exaggeration than ours.

McDonough ‘15

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Civil liberties organizations as well as a number of academic scholars have routinely criticized post-9/11 counterterrorism initiatives as unconstitutional and major threats to civil liberties and privacy. Harmonizing with the claims from civil liberties groups are contributions in the popular and scholarly discourse on surveillance and counterterrorism that lament the purported negative impact of governmental policies and related surveillance and intelligence activities on personal rights and liberties. The revelations by former security contractor Edward Snowden in June 2013 concerning alleged spying practices by the National Security Agency (NSA) greatly reinvigorated these debates. We investigate here if there is any counter-evidence to the alarmist statements that are often made in the popular and scholarly discourse on civil liberties and surveillance. Against the background of academic scholarship on surveillance and criticisms from civil liberty and privacy groups, we rely on archival sources, government documents, and media reports to examine a variety of claims made concerning civil liberties violations by security agencies. Our analysis reveals that at least a sizeable number of claims raised against counterterrorism practices are without objective foundation in terms of any actual violations. As an explanation for this marked discrepancy, we suggest that, as various survey data show, there is a relatively distinct, albeit it uneven and not entirely stable, culture of privacy and civil liberties in contemporary American society which independently contributes to a fear of counterterrorism, rather than of terrorism. These specific cultural sensitivities bring about an increase in the amount of civil rights allegations independent of actual violations thereof.

### AT: Chaterjee Maira Systemic Card

#### Alt causes to disposability- the aff doesn't resolve structural crises like capitalism, racism, all of which contribute to a mindset that makes people think that they are disposable

### AT: Spillover

#### Proves the link to the DA, they literally are using military criticism to decrease it’s power abroad and limit policies

### TL- Heg- Econ Scenario

#### Robust empirics prove heg doesn’t cause downturn, and higher military spending helps the economy

**Brooks et al 12**

Stephen G. Brooks (Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College), G. John Ikenberry (Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University), and William Wohlforth (Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College). “Don’t Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment.” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 3. Winter 2012. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3703\_Brooks%20Wohlforth%20Ikenberry.pdf

The problem with the claim that pursuing leadership imposes growth-sapping opportunity costs is that subsequent research has found virtually no evidence for it. Research in economics has yielded no consensus theory or accepted empirical finding to support the assumption that reduced U.S. military spending would improve the country’s economic growth. As one review summed it up, the “literature in economics has not found military expenditure to be a significant determinant of growth.”51 This finding is robust to all three major growth models in economics, a huge array of identification strategies, various country groupings (e.g., developed vs. developing), and concerning the United States itself. Indeed, when considered in the aggregate, the most common finding is a positive relationship between military spending and growth.52 In a departure from the broader research in economics, political scientists Karen Rasler and William Thompson conducted a study tailored to the specific claims about the costs of hegemonic grand strategies. Their findings “do not support the argument that consumption-driven investment tradeoffs are critical to an understanding of the relative decline of system leaders.”53 Obviously, there are some limits to this overall claim: if the United States were a dramatic outlier among the advanced economies, spending Soviet Union–type levels on defense (20 to 25 percent) over decades, this would surely complicate its growth trajectory and relative competitiveness. But even when fully engaged in the Afghan war and with many of the expensive militarized responses to the September 11 attacks still in place, the United States is not spending a historically high proportion of its GDP on the military (4.5 percent in 2012) either in absolute terms or in relation to its primary economic competitors. The flip side of this finding is that the economic performance of U.S. allies is unrelated to any security subsidy they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the economic rise of Japan, West Germany, and other U.S. allies seemed plausible when Gilpin, Calleo, and Kennedy were publishing their signature books in the 1980s. Their relative position vis-à-vis the United States essentially stopped improving subsequently, however, as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels—just as standard growth models would expect. Over the past twenty years, the United States’ total and per capita GDP relative to key European allies and Japan has either held steady or improved despite a growing gap in respective military efforts. In sum, there is scant theoretical or empirical reason to link rates of growth to either the distribution of power or the specific policies the United States pursues to sustain its leadership. As Thompson notes, it is unclear “why uneven growth should be viewed as a function of unbalanced power.”54 No scholarly theory or empirical findings clearly link the 2007–09 financial collapse, great recession, and consequent ballooning of the U.S. budget deficit to the international system (at least, as scholars of international security construe it). Nor does any established research finding show a connection between any U.S. security commitment and the causes of the economic downturn. Nor is there reason to expect that resources freed up from global commitments would necessarily be diverted to uses more advantageous for long-term U.S. growth. The downturn might affect the United States’ willingness to sustain defense spending at 3 to 4 percent of GDP and may even prompt Washington to reevaluate some of its security commitments, but that does not mean that defense spending or security commitments or any other policy associated with U.S. hegemony caused the downturn in the first place.

#### Economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that escalates and goes nuclear

- Terrorist appeals will decline, groups in 2025 will be descendants of long established groups, that become self- radicalized in the absence of economic outlets.

- close proximity nuclear rivals will produce inherent difficulties.

- less cooperation increases and pushes tensions over the bwrik

- cooperation manages resources and dincreasingly differnet

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf> Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**.** It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### 1NC- Heg Sustainable- TL

#### Heg is sustainable; current strategy allows for defense cuts and doesn’t require a larger budget

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The other term in the cost equation—the budgetary demands of deep engagement—is also a moving target. Retrenchment advocates tend to write as if post–September 11 levels of defense spending are necessary to maintain the deep engagement strategy, but it is already clear that this is not the case. After the September 11 attacks, defense spending increased dramatically, owing in large part to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of course, not all of the increased defense spending since September 11 resulted from the costly occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan; a significant portion of the increase was caused by an augmented effort to field and use military tools in the wider war on terrorism. Both of these drivers of increased spending during the past decade have already begun to be reversed, as the United States winds down the two costly wars and begins to trim nonwar “base” spending.As of the fall of 2012, the Defense Department based planning on cuts of just under $500 billion over the next five years, maintaining that these reductions would not compromise the national security strategy. A report published by the Center for a New American Security agreed that “America’s global engagement strategy as it is currently articulated” can be sustained with national defense cuts in the $500 billion to $550 billion range.21 As figure 1 shows, these cuts are expected to bring defense expenditures as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) below 3 percent by 2017, even though spending in real terms will be roughly $100 billion higher than the late 1990s.22 Importantly, these figures may not represent the floor for spending to sustain the strategy over the long term: according to many experts, rebalancing security efforts from military to civilian tools and much-discussed reforms to the way the Pentagon does business—including procurement practices and compensation policies—potentially could save significant additional sums.23 Two points about budget costs emerge. First, the United States can sustain the budgetary cost of deep engagement, even if a future administration should decide to increase funding substantially. Even the largest defense increase seriously discussed in the 2012 presidential campaign would not bring military spending as a share of GDP back to its 2011 level. Given the vast gap in military capabilities between the United States and China, the absence of real counterbalancing (discussed below), and the fact that deep engagement has made U.S. allies of most of the world’s most advanced and capable military powers, China’s economic rise will not demand a dramatic increase in U.S. military efforts anytime soon.24 To be sure, the politics of the defense budget may well become contentious in a tough fiscal climate.25 However, that prospect hardly means that deep engagement cannot be sustained. Rather, it underlines the increased importance of the grand strategy debate this article seeks to advance.

#### Cost savings from retrenchment are too uncertain and modest at best

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Speaking for many retrenchment advocates, Christopher Layne maintains that “the nation’s ballooning budget deficits are going to make it increasingly difficult to sustain [the United States’] level of military commitments.... [I]ts strategic commitments exceed the resources available to support them.”16 The budgetary cost of deep engagement is the difference between the expenditures the strategy demands and the amount required for its replacement. The problem is that there are no consensus estimates for either number. This challenge is particularly acute concerning the cost of the grand strategy that would replace retrenchment. Critics of deep engagement develop strong general arguments about the costs and risks of maintaining alliance commitments, but they typically leave unclear exactly what to do about them. Should all alliances and security commitments be summarily abrogated? If so, the savings would be significant. CATO Institute analysts Benjamin Friedman and Justin Logan estimate that this alternative—revoking all U.S. security guarantees and alliances, bringing all overseas deployed troops home, reconfiguring the navy to “surge to fight rare wars rather than patrol the world in the name of stability,” decommissioning large numbers of personnel in all branches, slashing the nuclear deterrent force, and dramatically scaling back weapons procurement—would save some $900 billion over ten years.17 Few advocates of retrenchment are so specific, and fewer still unambiguously endorse the idea of reverting to the pre–World War II strategy of an “insular, maritime power” with limited reach beyond the Western Hemisphere. A decision to abandon allies and partners, close bases, shed personnel on a large scale, and trim major defense infrastructure would be exceedingly hard to reverse, dramatically raising the costs should the United States ever decide that an overseas intervention were necessary. Few retrenchment advocates appear sufficiently confident that no such overseas interventions will ever be necessary to recommend such a course.18 Instead, their criticisms of deep engagement are usually accompanied by calls for “restraint,” “offshore balancing,” or “over the horizon” strategies rather than a wholesale abandonment of all major U.S. commitments. These strategies vary along two dimensions: force structure (decommissioning vs. redeployment home; downsizing vs. shifting from Army/Marines to Navy; eliminating the U.S. overseas military footprint everywhere or just in selected regions, etc.); and security commitments (whether to maintain commitments but defend them from offshore; cut some commitments but not all; or cut all commitments).19 The budgetary savings that such strategies would yield are unclear. They depend on which security commitments are to be abandoned outright and over what period of time, how U.S. allies would respond, and how much it would cost to make the remaining commitments credible from an over-the-horizon stance. If the alternative strategy requires keeping a similarly sized force in the United States, then the expected savings are modest given that host governments generally cover many infrastructure costs of U.S. forces and bases. And if it requires the maintenance of major expeditionary capacity, again, the savings, if any, might be modest owing to the need for continued or even enhanced investment in the kinds of weapons platforms that now eat up so much of the defense budget.20 Until retrenchment advocates provide more specifics, the most that can be said is that their alternatives might promise some savings, though considerably less than full strategic disengagement.

# 2NC

## Heg Good DA

### \*\*! Weighing\*\*’

### TL Mag O/W

#### 1. Scope of impact- it affects a larger scope of people and is more imminent whereas the aff’s impact can be solved by intervening imapcts

#### 2. Causes the internal link- war causes sv in the long run because after wars institutions collapse and rights protections are hardr

#### 3. Reversibility- psychological issues from hearing hateful things affect people in the short run, but it’s not as reversible.

#### 4. s/l- if we have a ton of defense to their impact compared to marginal defense against ours, prefer the war impacts

### AT: Aggregation

#### 1. heg happens everyday too, we see it manifest itself in the form of Assad's chemical weapons, consistent Syrian infighting, Russia and Chinese counterbalancing that slowly allows those conflicts in Eurasia to uprise because they are backed without actual encounter from the west.

#### 2. there is a credible brink scenario, this presumes that our impact doesn't happen for some time but that begs the question of whose winning uniqueness on the impact debate

#### 3. the aff resolves such a small amount of violence if it even stops any deaths from occuring that even if their impact was to aggregate it wouldn't stop sufficient impacts from taking their effects of aggregation

### AT: Probability

#### 1. Begs the question of whose winning the cards on the impact dbate- it still does have a high probability as long as we win a risk of our impact--- evidence that they’ve conceded

#### 2. Magnitude over probability- that’s the top level weighing claims

### \*\*Link Turns\*\*

### TL Overview: Link Turns

#### 1. default to evidence on the link debate, it outweighs their analytical link turns because a. our authors are experts who have conducted actual research in the field which means that it's a better depiction of what the real world is like, b. they refer to actual empirical instances of the link scenarios which take into account every single factor but their arguments are simply predictive

#### 2. you should be very skeptical of these link turns because they are in direct contrast to their cx answers in which they framed the aff as a method to end military primacy abroad through spillover and actual policies which is also another reason their link turns, which are honestly just excuses of arguments because they know they can't beat us on the heg debate.

### AT: Backlash

#### 1. Your magnitude weighing argument doesn’t make sense here, so it’s not a reason to prefer the link turn over the link

#### 2. uniqueness deficit- if protests are stable right now that's a uniqueness argument for the neg because we maintain current recruitment levels whereas you drop them. we don't cause even more people to protest because the 1nc doesn’t propose to censor more people so there is 0 change in how much protests occur

#### 3. no link- if the 1ac link ev. is true that policing free speech actually chills academics from speaking out then that proves that we actually mitigate the amount of protests that happen rather than cause more of them otherwise the aff doesn't do anything

### AT: Critical Thinking Military Reform

#### 1. Weak Strength of link- checking the military is an excuse for dramatically weakening it, that’s proven by the 1AC evidence which indicates that there will be military drawdown i.e. your spillover claims

#### 2. The 1NC link outweighs: A. you wreck recruitment levels which is a shitty way of changing the military, that outweighs because recruitment levels are on the brink right now whereas the aff pushes them way over . They are also the strongest internal link back to actual heg because it's a question of hard power., B. the aff nebulosuly improves critical thinking but destroys the foundations of the army which is a prerequisite for any actual heg.

#### 3. Protests don't direct better policies for the military, the military uses rigorous defense analysis and highly academic research to find threats so we should trust them- there is a disconnect between telling the military to back out of potentially dangerous areas that require stabilization from the hegemon.

#### 4. Even if they do win that protests reform the military, liberalization will redirect the military to the far left and make them too soft which simply reinstates our threats.

### AT: No Link- Don’t Decrease Military

#### not our argument, it's about weakening resolve and commitment to military primacy, recruitment on college campuses, and selective readings which distance the public from the military which hurts civil-miilitary relations.